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How can evolutionary ideas be applied to the study of social and political institutions? Darwin 
identified the mechanisms of variation, selection and retention. He emphasized that evolutionary 
change depends on the uniqueness of every individual and its interactions within a population 
and with its environment. While introducing the contributions to this special issue, we examine 
some of the ontological positions underlying evolutionary theory, showing why they are 
appropriate for studying issues in economics, political science and sociology. We consider how 








In recent years there has been an explosion of interest in evolutionary theory in wide variety of 
scientific domains.
1
  In fields as diverse as computer science, philosophy, economics, sociology, 
psychology, biology, and anthropology, ―evolutionary thinking‖ has come to the forefront of 
each discipline. Although the term ―evolution‖ takes on a number of different meanings, 
prominent contributors to the current ―evolutionary turn‖ in the social sciences have explicitly or 
implicitly deployed concepts redolent of the Darwinian principles of variation, retention and 
selection (Campbell 1965, Tilly and Ardant 1975, Hayek and Shenfield 1983, Nelson and Winter 
2002). In this introductory essay we explore some of the key insights suggested by evolutionary 
theorists across several disciplines and examine how they may help us better understand key 
conundrums confronted in political science and economics.  
The analysis is divided into three main parts.  In part (1), we present a basic overview of 
some of the key concepts in evolutionary theory. We show how evolutionary theory has built on 
and developed Darwin‘s key propositions that point to variation, retention, and environmental 
selection as the key mechanisms of change.  In part (2), we highlight the distinctive ontological 
and epistemological positions necessary for evolutionary theories.  Whereas much social science 
assumes ―equilibrium,‖ evolutionary theory is explicitly dynamic and is specifically interested in 
interdependent relationships and the emergent characteristics of complex interactions. In part (3), 
we apply this evolutionary framework to two key questions of interest to social scientists.  First, 
we explore the implications of evolutionary theory for our understandings of human preferences. 
                                                 
1
 Four of papers published in this special issue – by Beinhocker, Dunbar, Ostrom and Basurto, and Pagano – derive 
from a conference on ‗Do Institutions Evolve?‘ held at the European University Institute in Florence in May 2009. 
The authors thank Jens Beckert, Robert Jervis, Edgar Kiser, Freidrich Kratokwil, Tom Pepinsky, Bo Rothstein, 
Kathleen Thelen, and Stefan Svalforss for very helpful comments on this introduction.  All errors in fact and 
interpretation remain our own. 
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We contend that evolutionary theory holds out the possibility of synthesizing micro-level 
approaches, rooted in assumptions about ―human nature,‖ as well as macro-level structural 
accounts that argue preferences are shaped and constrained by institutions. Second, we consider 
the implications of evolutionary theory for the study of institutional change.  From genes, which 
are rules governing cell behavior, we move to political institutions, which involve rules 
governing political behavior.   
 
1:  Evolutionary Principles 
Rather than seeing life on earth divided into distinct categories (species), in which all members 
of a population were both immutable and alike, Charles Darwin saw phenomenal variation 
within species and he conceptualized variation as a key component of change.  Darwin argued 
that the key mechanism was ―natural selection.‖  Darwin saw that species, and even populations, 
were not fixed and absolute categories – populations were composed of varied individuals. This 
is known today as ‗population thinking‘ (Mayr 1982). Some individuals possess traits that give 
them an advantage in their environment and in the competition for resources and mates.  
Consequently, they would have more offspring than others and ultimately increase those traits 
within the population. Thus, in evolutionary terms, certain traits are selected because they are 
more successful in a given environment. In this way, species evolved to have different traits over 
time.  In some cases this would mean that the entire population would change.  In other cases, 
especially in instances of geographic isolation (allopatry) populations would diverge to such an 
extent that new species and categories ultimately emerged.
 
 The key features of Darwinian theory 
have long been matters of discussion for biologists and philosophers of biology (Mayr 1982, 
1988, 2001, 2004, Sober 1984, Hull 1988, Price 1970, 1995, Dennett 1995). A consensus exists 
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that Darwinism rests on the three central principles of variation, retention and selection. Darwin 
(1859) himself highlighted them in his final paragraph of The Origin of Species. 
After Darwin, a succession of authors suggested that his ideas might apply to other 
evolving systems, particularly culture and political and economic institutions (Bagehot 1872, 
Ritchie 1896, Veblen 1899, Keller 1915).  But these early attempts were sidelined as the social 
sciences rejected any connection with biology in the wake of justifications of war in terms of the 
―survival of the fittest‖, rampant racism, widespread eugenics, Nazism and other horrors of the 
twentieth century. Consequently the idea of generalizing and extending Darwinian principles 
remained underdeveloped until it was revived much later by Donald T. Campbell (1965), 
Richard Dawkins (1976) and others. Although some aspects of this project to generalize 
Darwinism remain controversial, the Darwinian principles of variation, retention and selection 
are evident in many ―evolutionary‖ contributions in the social sciences. 
Indeed, that may result from the nature of the phenomena under investigation. Darwin‘s 
theory addressed populations of entities, where there was variation among individuals, each 
individual faced immediately scarce resources, information relevant to survival could be 
inherited in some way, and circumstances cause some entities to prosper more than others. 
Human institutions are populations of entities that fit this abstract description. Hence although 
Darwin developed his principles in a biological context, they apply to populations of social 
entities as well.  
Eric Beinhocker (2006: 12) puts it this way: ―Modern evolutionary theorists believe that, 
like gravity, evolution is a universal phenomenon meaning that no matter whether the algorithm 
is running in the substrate of biological DNA, a computer program, the economy, or the substrate 
of an alien biology on a distant planet, evolution will follow certain general laws in its behavior.‖ 
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Beinhocker (2011) himself makes an important contribution in this special issue by showing that 
Darwinian evolution, in whatever domain is essentially an informational process. 
This generalization of Darwinian principles does not mean that we attempt to explain 
social phenomena in biological terms, or uphold that biological and social evolution are identical 
processes. On the contrary, the generalization of Darwinian principles depends on some 
ontological communality at an abstract level, not at the level of detail. It is a matter of neither 
biological analogy nor biological reductionism (Aldrich et al. 2008, Hodgson and Knudsen 
2010).   
Today there is fairly widespread agreement among many evolutionary theorists that there 
are multiple levels of selection.  Of course, scientists have different emphases, but few reject the 
idea that selection operates at the levels of genes, organisms, populations and (more 
controversially) species. This opens the door to higher-level selection processes at the social 
level, involving social institutions. 
 
2: Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions in Evolutionary Theory 
 
At the root of evolutionary biology is the assumption that the objects of analysis—living 
organisms—are fundamentally different from inanimate matter. More generally, evolution is a 
function of environmental constraints, interactions between entities, and a code carried by their 
replicators.  This duality is also evident in the institutionalist literature, as seen in debates about 
the relative importance micro-level motivations and macro-level structure (Sewell 1992). 
Second, evolutionary theory is the study of ―complex adaptive systems‖ (Holland 1992).  
This notion accepts the importance of emergent properties and specifically attempts to 
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understand the ways in which entities interact with one another and their environment in a 
dynamic process.  The character of the whole population is distinct from that of its constituent 
units: interaction is the key aspect of such an emergent system.  
An illustration of emergence is found in the essay in this issue by Scott Carson (2011), 
who seeks to find the relationship between height (as a proxy for fitness conditions) and periods 
of institutional change (institutions of Slavery and Post-War reconstruction in nineteenth Century 
Tennessee. Carson introduces the additional independent variable of proximity to the Mississippi 
river, which may be either welfare enhancing or decreasing through the net import, or export, of 
goods. In particular, eastern Tennessee slaves were sheltered from the net export effects of trade. 
Carson finds that while the statures of African Americans declined over time, the statures of 
white Tennessee residents declined by twice as much. Stature was sensitive to proximity to water 
in general, but overall ―statures reflected a complex set of economic, social and biological 
factors.‖  
The implications are significant. Instead of viewing the world as a product of linear 
relationships between constant variables, understanding emergence allows us to understand how 
contingency is embedded within the system itself.  Change is no longer simply the product of 
external shocks, but embedded within evolutionary history. 
This ―interactionist‖ model of science suggests a very different scientific epistemology.  
Much experimental research in biology deals with proximate causation (i.e., how the genetic 
code causes different characteristics or behaviors).  Similarly, experimental research in 
economics and political science focuses on how decisions are made at the individual level.  In 
contrast, evolutionary biology focuses on ultimate causation—how environment and history have 
exerted an influence on the way that individuals adapt and change over time.   
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This leads to a major difference between the physical and natural sciences on the question 
of prediction. In a definite or probabilistic sense, and analytically or through iterative 
computations, prediction is often possible in the physical sciences using the laws of physics. In 
contrast, the complexities of the interacting populations of evolutionary theory make meaningful 
prediction much more difficult and often impossible. 
Finally, both positive feedbacks and the complexities of fitness landscapes mean that 
history matters. Consequently, a key method of analysis is that of historical narrative that 
describes the influence of historical contingency and environmental factors on outcomes (Mayr 
1988). Rather than predicting the future, the goal of evolutionary theorists is to understand the 
forces and dynamics that have shaped the world as we know it.  Specifically they are interested 
in understanding how and why some entities adapt, prosper, and some die out.   
Evolutionary theorists are unable to predict distinct future evolutionary adaptations 
because evolutionary theory accepts that accidental variations or bifurcations within complex 
systems can set development along totally new and unpredictable paths.
2
 For these reasons, 
evolutionary scientists are necessarily engaged in path analysis. They are interested in both 
explaining adaptations and understanding the consequences of those adaptations.  
This epistemological framework might raise a number of objections from social scientists 
accustomed to standards of science derived from Newtonian physics. For example, if 
explanations are constructed post-hoc and cannot be falsified via experimentation, then how can 
they be falsified?  We reply that although falsification is a worthy goal, the simple fact is that 
some research questions defy these standard models of scientific study.  Once again, given a 
                                                 
2
 The huge literature dealing with these puzzles includes Futuyma and Slatkin (1983), Mayr (1988), Holland (1992), 
Jervis (1997), Hoffman and Riley (1999), Pierson (2000), Zimmer (2001), Kerr (2002), Ridley (2003). 
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macro-level emphasis on the interaction of complex systems, it is impossible to reduce these 
events to basic covering laws.  This may explain why Popper (1974, p. 281) himself argued that 
―as a philosophy, reductionism is a failure … we live in a universe of emergent novelty; of a 
novelty which, as a rule, is not completely reducible to any of the preceding stages.‖ 
Consequently, theory construction in evolutionary biology resembles a process of comparative 
historical analysis, rather than experimentation and falsification.  While ―just so‖ stories can be 
problematic, they can be ―tested‖ against the historical record and the probability that any 
particular theory is correct can constantly be updated against new evidence.   
 
3:  Evolutionary Theory and Institutions 
 
Before entering into the discussion of how evolution applies to human institutions, we address 
one of the most prominent critiques of such an analysis: that human‘s are unique creatures and 
that theories applied to the rest of the biological world do not apply to human beings. The crux of 
this argument is that humans are sentient beings. Humans can intentionally change their own 
history. The critics conclude that human social evolution is qualitatively distinct from the 
evolution of other organisms. As such, evolutionary theories and insights should have no 
relevance or applicability to the human experience.  
Of course, humans have evolved the most complex brains on this planet. Our large 
cerebral cortex co-evolved with the development of social interaction and sophisticated 
languages, as Robin Dunbar (1996, 2011) elaborates in this special issue and elsewhere. Humans 
are unique, but so too are gorillas, honeybees, and e-coli. The key difference between humans 
and other living creatures is that humans have developed the most powerful cognitive capacities, 
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with complex levels of self-reference and pre-figuration, sophisticated systems of information 
retention and communication, and the most complex social organizations.
 
But this does not rule 
out the existence of abstract ontological communalities with other evolving systems. At a highly 
abstract kevel, similar evolutionary principles will apply. Hence it is reasonable to suggest that 
human society, politics, and institutions are the products of evolutionary processes.   
Indeed, once one adds intelligence into a system, both its complexity and adaptive 
capacity increase dramatically.  If agents can intelligently anticipate the effects of their actions, 
even if they are spectacularly wrong about those intended consequences in some cases, then the 
effects of evolution on social systems is tied in with the evolution of the expectations themselves.  
Agents‘ interactions with their environments are interdependent with their understandings of 
those environments.
3
 In short, human intelligence may well enhance the evolutionary capacities 
of human social organization. Instead of suggesting an exception to the rules of evolution, human 
intelligence and cognitive abilities help explain why human social organizations evolve quite 
quickly.
4
 As Modelski (2007.p. 1) argues: ―Where ‗natural‘ selection acts via genetic material, 
and must necessarily take time, ‗social‘ selection is faster, involves cultural transmission, and 
acts upon clusters of human behavior embodied in policies and strategies.‖ 
Jamie Morgan and Wendy Olsen‘s (2011) essay in this special issue on rules and rule-
governed behavior speaks directly to this point. Examining the concept of rules and rule systems, 
and drawing on both John Searle and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Morgan and Olsen argue that some 
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 Richard Nelson makes a similar point when he argues, ―I want to highlight that my insistence that human purpose 
and intelligence often plays a major role in the evolution of culture does not mean that the process is not 
evolutionary. The clear fact that scientists, and technologists, carefully consider what they do does not mean that 
progress in science and technology can be understood as the result of a coherent plan. But a serious theory of the 
evolution of human culture cannot assume that humans can not think ahead, and often with considerable 
sophistication.‖ (Nelson 2007: 87).   
4
 For an interesting analysis of the evolutionary character in the interactions between humans and their ecology see: 
(Liu et al. 2007). 
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conceptions of rules are too constraining. As well as constraining behavior, rules and the 
interdependencies between them create complex webs of possible actions and permissions. If this 
way they create the potential for agency, but that agency is an emergent and creative force that 
evolves in relation to the ‗fluidity‘ that rule sets permit. Morgan and Olsen argue for a world that 
is computable in the sense that humans can make sense of ‗what to do in context X given rule Y‘ 
by social processing via shared knowledge. As such, although a taxonomy of rule forms may 
help specify both what is possible and even permissible in a given environment, the precise 
outcome is a function of its ―practical dynamism…how a rule may be broken, bent innovated or 
transformed‖ with ―Rules, themselves [being the] expressive aspect of the inter-subjectivity or 
reality". This entire conception is consistent with an evolutionary framework involving selection, 
variation, and retention.  
In a multi-level selection framework there is significant competition between individuals, 
organizations, societies, and political systems, which can be seen as evolutionary processes.  War 
and business rivalry are obvious manifestations of this competition, but populations compete for 
resources in many other ways.   
The search for a better understanding of human preferences is one of the most pressing 
issues in the social sciences.  In political science, Peter Katzenstein noted that one of the key 
differences between rational choice and historical institutionalism is that the former assumes a 
constant and universal set of preferences whereas historical institutionalists are critically 
interested in explaining why preferences vary across time and space (Steinmo et al. 1992).
5
  
More recently, Ira Katznelson and Barry Weingast have admitted that, ―[p]references are 
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 Sophisticated rational-choice theorists have backed off the narrow assumption that human motivations can be 
reduced to simple, self-interested, homo economicus. See North (1992), Levi (1997), Elster (1998), Elster (2000), 
Bowles and Gintis (2005, 2011), Weingast (2005).   
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foundational for any theory that relies on agency,‖ but, ―[w]e know too little about preferences, 
where they come from, or how they are generated.‖ (Katznelson and Weingast 2005:2).   
Evolutionary theory can help us explain human preferences. All living things—including 
humans—try to survive.  Successful entities develop quite complicated and highly regulated 
behavioral strategies (rules), which facilitate success in the context in which they live.  All social 
creatures inherit the desire to follow social rules and be parts of social groups, and all social 
beings adopt social or cooperative strategies in order to survive and reproduce.  What matters is 
not only the survival of the individuals but also the survival of the institutions that enable 
individual interaction, cooperation and reproduction.  
Dunbar (2011) argues that cognitive limits (very roughly related to brain size) have very 
significant implications for both the size of traditional communities and the structure of larger 
and larger social organizations that we have managed to construct as societies have become more 
complex. Drawing from a variety of substantive examples and research he demonstrates that 
human social structures will have remarkably specific organizational structures.  Certainly, 
human institutions have developed enormous complexity and involve massive numbers of 
individuals, but when understood in the light of Dunbar‘s analysis of human cognitive limitations 
we have a much greater understanding of why certain kinds of human social structures evolve 
and persist while others seem virtually impossible.  
Recalling Darwin‘s basic insight that variation is the key to evolutionary processes, we 
note that there can be an enormous diversity of individual preferences even when the whole 
species is motivated by a shared preference for reproduction. Preferences are the product of both 
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evolutionary adaptations to previous environments and our individual development. Once again, 
history, nature and nurture fundamentally shape the preference structure of every individual.
6
  
Because preferences grow from personal experience and species history, we should 
expect the following propositions to hold: different populations will develop different preference 
clusters; there will be significant variation within populations; and individuals may have multiple 
and often conflicting preferences. Even if our most basic motivation is to survive to pass on our 
genes and reproduce, then many different behaviors may result. In part these outcomes depend 
on the structure and resilience of social groups, where the survival of the individual depends on 
the survival of the group. Consequently, as Darwin (1871) himself noted, a society made up of 
purely selfish individualists could not last long. Real human societies are composed of 
individuals possessing a variety of preferences and motivations, ranging from extreme 
selfishness to inspiring altruism. 
There is very strong empirical and theoretical support for the propositions that human 
beings have dispositions to cooperate as well as to show self-interest in particular circumstances 
(Henrich et al. 2001, Thayer 2004, Bowles and Gintis 2005, 2011). Recent work shows that there 
are specific parts of the human brain that influence these basic preferences (Knoch et al. 2006).  
Equally interestingly, these parts in the brain also seem to be related to the sections of the brain 
that stimulate preferences for reciprocity and fairness in individuals (Fehr 2006).  There are 
booming literatures in evolutionary biology, psychology, anthropology and economics that are 
converging on the argument that the human brain has evolved to advantage cooperation.
7
  The 
                                                 
6
 As Alford and Hibbings (2004) show in their study, identical twins separated at birth appear to share some 
predilections, but it is impossible to predict their personalities. 
7
 See for example, Dawkins (1982), Barkow et al. (1992), D'Andrade and Strauss (1992), D'Andrade (1993), 
Hartung (1995), Shore (1996), Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Nelson and Winter (2002), Ziman et al. (2002), 
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human mind is neither a ―blank slate‖ nor a purely strategic calculative computer.8  This insight 
turns the rationalist‘s dilemma (how is it possible that human‘s ever built social institutions in 
the first place?) into a non-problem: the primates from which homo sapiens evolved were already 
a social species, replete with social rules, norms and behaviors. Humans thrived precisely 
because their genetic capacities and their preferences for cooperation advantaged them over their 
competitors.  
If certain types of political institutions advantage or favor particular behaviors and 
attitudes, then institutional differences may have more long-run evolutionary consequences than 
the simple fact that certain political strategies are chosen in one context over another (Sardemov 
2007). Political institutions are created and evolve. Institutions are created and changed by 
individuals who have preferences of their own and basic suppositions about how other people 
behave. If their preferences are products of both their genetic inheritance and their social 
experience, then it makes sense to consider who created (or changed) specific institutions and 
why they constructed the institutions they did. 
In this special issue, Elinor Ostrom and Xavier Basurto (2011) address the evolution of 
rules and norms directly, building particularly on empirical studies of the management of 
common-pool resources. They argue that most previous analytical tools in the social sciences are 
address static situations, but these are inadequate to understand dynamic situations – particularly 
institutional change. Analytical tools must help the analyst to record the processes of change in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hammerstein (2003), Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), Bowles and Gintis (2005, 2011), Gureck et al. (2006), Knoch et 
al. (2006), Nelson (2007). 
8
 For a summary of evolutionary psychology and its implications for social science see Cosmides and Tooby (1997).  
Anthropologists have their own debates over the origins of cooperation, individual self-interest and preferences for 
sociality.  See Boyd and Richerson (2005a, 2005b), Richerson and Boyd (2005) and Sperber and Claidi `ere (2006). 
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multiple specific settings so that lessons from such settings can eventually be integrated into a 
more general theory of institutional change. 
Notably, almost every political constitution begins with broad statements about ―human 
nature‖ that are based in different assumptions about human natures (Ehrlich 2000).  The 
evolutionary point is that these different institutional designs may ultimately structure different 
human natures.  If so, they have far more important implications than simply constraining 
strategic behavior.  If they advantage certain types of individuals over others (e.g., rationalists 
over contextualists, or systemizers over empaths), then they may also have the evolutionary 
effects of shaping who wins, who loses, who reproduces and who does not, and what we prefer. 
Many social scientists today are groping for a better understanding of origins and 
mechanisms of institutional and political change. The problem is that most social science models 
assume fixed mechanisms.  We are told that variable X affects variable Y causing outcome Z.  
This kind of analysis can be extremely useful to explain the proximate outcome Z, but it is 
necessarily limited in its ability to explain change in Z other than to demonstrate that it must be 
related to a change in X or Y.  What such approaches cannot do, and perhaps are not interested in, 
is explain why there is a change in X or Y. 
Traditional rational choice theory, assumes that actors maximize their utility, with given 
utility functions.
9
  Thus, any given institutional setting will eventually reach an equilibrium in 
which ―no one has the incentive to change his or her choice‖ (Levi 1997: 27).  Subsequently, the 
only source of change is exogenous.  As Levi argues, ―it is obvious that choices change regularly 
and constantly. … To understand these changes requires a set of hypotheses concerning what 
                                                 
9
 Some choice theorists appear to have backed away from these assumptions (Greif and Laitin 2004, Weingast 2005, 
Levi 2006, North 2006). 
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exogenous shocks or alterations to the independent variables will have what effects on the 
actions of the individuals under study‖ (Levi, 1997: 28).10   
In political science, the ―historical institutionalists‖ have had the most success in 
exploring the mechanisms of political change (Steinmo et al. 1992, Pierson 2000, 2004, Thelen 
2004, Streeck and Thelen 2005). The importance of time, path dependence, increasing returns 
and institutional layering, are widely accepted as central to a better understanding of political 
change (Pierson 1993, 2000, 2004). Institutional economists have explored similar themes. For 
example, in this issue Ugo Pagano (2011) underlines the importance of institutional 
complementarities, which sometimes prevent marginal adjustments in the system from one 
configuration to another. Institutional complementarities dispose the system to a path dependent 
and possibly suboptimal evolutionary track.  
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (2005) make a major breakthrough in our 
understanding of institutional change. They asked policy experts from around the world to 
examine cases of policy change and specifically explore the endogenous sources of this change.  
―A general problem in contemporary institutional analysis‖ they correctly note, is that it has 
―always emphasized structural constraints and continuity.‖  Institutions, effectively are seen as 
―frozen residues, or ‗crystallizations‘, of previous political conflict.‖ (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 
6).
11
  These writings offer healthy antidotes to institutionalists‘ reliance on ―punctuated 
equilibrium‖ models to explain institutional change by making a case for what they call ―gradual 
                                                 
10
 The recent ‗historical‘ turn in rational choice theory is an example.  The key point for these scholars is to show 
that the theorized relationship between actors holds in a wide variety of places and times.  See Levi (1988), 
Lichbach (1995), Fiorina (1996) and Bates et al. (1998).  For a frank discussion of the epistemological issues 
dividing political science see (Wallerstein 2001). 
11
 Evoking further an evolutionary theory, Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 16) argue that institutions involve 
continuous interaction between rule makers and rule takers, during which new interpretations (mutations?) of the 
rule will be discovered, invented, rejected and maybe adopted.   
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transformational change.‖  Curiously they argue that theirs‘ is not a model of ―adaptive change.‖  
They state, ―We ask how we may distinguish ‗real‘ change from ‗superficial‘, merely adaptive 
change, and how to detect change in the absence of disruptive events leading to institutional 
breakdown‖ (p. 2).    
The key problem for Streeck and Thelen‘s analysis is that they do not have a theory of 
evolution. They nicely typologize different forms of institutional change but lack an explanation 
for these mechanisms.  Nevertheless, a careful reading of their volume suggests that they are in 
fact pointing towards a model of evolutionary change, precisely what evolutionists would call 
―adaptive change.‖ 12  This is reminiscent of the debate between Steven J. Gould and the 
―adaptionists‖ noted above, but in the case of political scientists it appears that the arguments 
have been reversed. Evolutionary theory since Darwin has argued that the major changes in 
history have been the product of small adaptations, the cumulative effects of which have been 
immense.  Gould‘s (1989) central argument was that life is conservative and the really big 
changes in life‘s history (usually extinctions) are the products of massive environmental shocks 
that ―punctuate‖ the ―equilibrium‖ of life.   
The standard model in political science has been closer to Gould‘s. We have even 
borrowed his terminology of ―punctuated equilibrium‖ (Krasner 1984, Steinmo et al. 1992).  
Having adopted the equilibrium view, political scientists end up being stuck with static models 
of life—only to be saved from the outside.  Increasingly though, theorists such as (Lieberman 
2002; Greif and Laitin 2004; Blyth 2006; Levi 2006; Steinmo 2008) and many others argue that 
―exogenous‖ models of change are insufficient, similar to most evolutionary theorists.  Today, as 
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 Thelen‘s (2004) award-winning book uses the term ‗evolution‘ in its title, 34 times in the first chapter, and each 
substantive chapter is titled ―The Evolution of…‖ but she never actually defines ‗evolution.‘ 
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we noted above, it is widely accepted that both adaptation and punctuation are important parts of 
the evolutionary account (Mayr 2001).
13
  
There is no perfectly static state in the history of life.  Change is the norm.  Sometimes 
change can occur quite rapidly, such as when after an asteroid impact the sun is blotted out for 
several days. But such events are rare. Most change is gradual. But adaption should be 
understood as exogenous. There is an interactive and dynamic relationship between organisms 
and their environment. What is true for organism and environment is true for institutions as well: 
institutions are not independent of their environment (Steinmo 2010). Our environment is 
constantly changing, and we are constantly changing our environment. This is not confined to 
climate change – consider the relationship between the media, elections, and technology. These 
factors are highly interdependent. 
Evolutionary theory offers a framework for understanding sources of endogenous and 
exogenous changes. It also provides an explicit theoretical framework for understanding how 
these sources of change interact in an incremental process. Evolutionary theorists point to 
replication as a primary source of novelty. Just as genes are not replicated perfectly, the 
replication of institutional rules is a highly imperfect process.  
As noted above, one of the unique features of human evolution is that humans have 
highly developed cognitive capacities. We are self-conscious and capable of building and 
sustaining highly complex social organizations. Many animal species learn and can even copy 
behaviors of others, but humans appear to have the most developed capacities for learning from 
one another. Perhaps this is why institutional evolution appears to accelerate as our 
communicative technologies expand. Clearly some institutions provide individuals with 
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 Even Gould seems to have moved in this direction in the last years of his life (Gould 2002a, 2002b).  
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competitive advantages, the most obvious example of which would be military strength, and 
these institutions can be copied by other groups.
 14
  
We are led to a different ontological position.  Rational choice theorists must recognize 
that preferences are not as stable as they often assume.  Historicists must accept that history and 
exogenous structures are not as stable as they assume.  In short, both preferences and situations 
vary, and their interplay is characteristic of evolution (Steinmo 2010).   
 
4: Conclusion: Social Science, Physics Envy, and the Evolutionary Advantage 
 
Mainstream economics and political science have emulated the hard sciences of physics and 
chemistry. Economics has even borrowed some of the mathematical formulations of nineteenth-
century physics (Mirowski 1989). According to James Farr (1995), political science‘s move in 
this direction was the result of a broader intellectual movement in the social sciences, which 
began early in the twentieth century. This led to a conception of scientific methodology 
involving the reductionist and predictive models that characterize Newtonian physics. In so 
doing, it was hoped that models would be developed that would uncover the general laws of 
economics and politics.  Farr (1995, p. 203) summarizes: ―the very aim of science, it was argued, 
was to discover laws or law like generalizations that organized and explained the facts.‖  
Zuckerman (1997: 279) concurs, ―the established goals of comparative politics reflect these 
standards.  As comparativists propose cross-national generalizations, they posit covering laws‖.15 
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 For example, Gureck et al. (2006) have shown that humans adapt their institutions and behaviors when they see 
other groups which use strategies or institutions that yield higher payoffs. 
15
 See also the critiques of Blyth (2006) and Lewis and Steinmo (2010). 
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This emulation of the physics misled political scientists and economists. Physics 
addresses the constant laws of the physical world.  By contrast, human society exhibits different 
institutions and mechanisms, ever-changing in time and space, and hence some theories may 
have to change to address the new phenomena (Hodgson 2001). The life sciences are a more 
appropriate inspiration for the social sciences. From such a perspective, efforts to create 
deductive models of political activity are inadequate both because context and time matter 
(Pierson 2004) and mechanical models do not help us to understand iterative and dynamic 
relationship between preferences, behavior and outcomes.   
Evolutionary theory promises a dynamic theory of institutions. Evolution assumes change 
and the transience of equilibrium. An evolutionary focus offers the chance to account for both 
micro and macro-level dynamics and therefore even holds out the possibility of reconciling some 
longstanding debates within the field, because it can explain why humans behave egoistically in 
some settings and altruistically in others. Evolutionary analysis holds out the possibility of 
uniting different subfields as well as different social sciences under a framework incidentally 
derived from the natural sciences but of greater theoretical generality. Evolutionary theory offers 
more than an interesting metaphor.  While human institutions evolve in ways very different from 
biological organisms, human social institutions—just like humans themselves—are products of 
evolutionary forces and processes, considered at an abstract level.  We need to take evolution 
seriously.   
 20 
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